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Abstract
Inertia and context-dependent choice effects are well-studied classes of behavioural phe-
nomena. While much is known about these effects individually, little is known about whether
one of them “dominates” another. Knowledge of any such dominance is important for ef-
fective choice architecture and for accurate descriptive modelling. We initiate this empirical
investigation with a lab experiment on choice under risk that was designed to test for domi-
nance between status quo bias and the decoy effect. We find that the former unambiguously
prevails over the latter and is powerful enough to make the average subject switch from being
risk averse to being risk-seeking. The observed reversal in risk attitudes is explainable by a
large class of Ko¨zsegi-Rabin (2006) reference-dependent preferences.
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1 Introduction
Status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) is the phenomenon whereby
decision makers are significantly more likely to choose a market alternative such
as a retirement savings plan or energy tariff when it is the “default” option than
when it is not. The decoy effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto, 1982), arguably the
most well-known example of context-dependent behaviour, refers to the tendency
of decision makers to exhibit a specific change in their choice between two alter-
natives when also presented with a third one that is dominated by only one of
the original two. These phenomena have been documented empirically in a wide
range of choice environments, both in the market and in the lab, and are among
the most well-known behavioural “anomalies” that cannot be explained by stan-
dard models of rational choice. Accordingly, they have also been the subject of
extended interdisciplinary modelling, with a plethora of suggested explanations
that range from reference-dependent preferences with exogenous or endogenous
reference points, context-dependent preferences, intrapersonal-bargaining, context-
dependent choices with stable but incomplete preferences, limited attention, as well
as learning and preference updating.1
Although much is known about these effects individually, however, little is
known about which one of them –if any– is stronger. Knowing the answer to
this question is important for at least two reasons:
1. Choice architecture (Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz, 2013; Johnson and Goldstein,
2003; Madrian and Shea, 2001). Policy makers or physical/online retailers
may opt for menu designs that aim to influence choice –e.g. over (risky)
retirement savings plans or (riskless) student meals, consumer products, or
even flu vaccination schedules (Maltz and Sarid, 2020)– in a certain direction.
Although the significance of both status quo bias and, separately, the decoy
effect on such choice architecture is well-known, what is potentially important
but presently unknown is whether a menu designer that intends to “nudge” a
decision maker away from some existing default option could achieve this by
introducing a decoy dominated option for the competitor target alternative.
2. Modelling guidance. While numerous models that explain one or more of these
effects are now available, no experimental or empirical study that we are aware
of has guided bounded-rational choice modelling of this kind at such a more
refined level. Knowing whether inertia or some context-dependent choice effect
is more powerful than the other –and if so, in which domains this is true– is
clearly essential for the descriptive appeal of such modelling.
Motivated by the above, in this paper we initiate the comparative empirical
1A non-exclusive list of references is Tversky and Kahneman (1992); Roe, Busemeyer, and Townsend (2001);
Munro and Sugden (2003); Usher and McClelland (2004); Lombardi (2009); Soltani, Martino, and Camerer (2012);
de Clippel and Eliaz (2012); Bordallo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013); Masatlioglu and Ok (2014); Ok, Ortoleva,
and Riella (2015); Gerasimou (2016); Dean, Kibris, and Masatlioglu (2017); Guney and Richter (2018); Kimya
(2018); Tserenjigmid (2019); Natenzon (2019).
1
analysis of inertia and context-dependent choice using data from a novel between-
subjects experiment that features three treatments and three money lotteries over
as many strictly positive outcomes, aiming to identify whether status quo bias is
stronger than the decoy effect in this environment of choice under risk. We find
that:
1. Status quo bias unambiguously prevails over the decoy effect and, contrary to
the findings reported in other studies on choice under risk, the latter effect is
completely absent in our data.
2. The riskier of the two main lotteries is chosen significantly more often when it
is the status quo than when it is not, due to subjects giving more significance
to the dominant “maximum reward” dimension of that lottery in this case.
3. This status-quo induced reversal in the risk attitude of the average subject
is explainable by a large class of Ko¨zsegi-Rabin (2006) reference-dependent
preferences.
We stress from the outset that in each of the three experimental treatments sub-
jects were asked to make a choice from a single menu of lotteries, and their chosen
lottery was then played out to determine their total rewards. This simplicity made
the experimental task and its incentivization very easy to understand. Moreover,
the fact that subjects saw and made a choice from a single menu enables us to rule
out any linkages between decisions across different problems that sometimes arise
in within-subjects designs.
2 Experiment
The experiment was conducted at the University of St Andrews Experimental
Economics laboratory between May 2018 and April 2019. Pilot sessions with dif-
ferent lotteries were also done in April-May 2017. Participants were recruited
with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experimental interface was created in z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Because we used a printed end-of-experiment survey form
and a non-computerized way to randomly determine the subjects’ winnings from
their chosen lottery, the average total duration of each session was 35 minutes. In
addition to their lottery winnings, subjects received a £2 participation fee.
Figure 1: The three lotteries
(a) Lottery A (b) Lottery B (c) Lottery A-decoy
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Figures 1 and 2 present, respectively, the three lotteries and treatments/decision
problems that we employed. In the first treatment, subjects were asked to choose
between lotteries A and B without being initially endowed with either of them.
In the second treatment, they were asked to choose between lotteries A, A-decoy
and B, also without an initial endowment. In the third treatment, they were given
an envelope that contained a printed card of lottery B. Once everyone received
their envelope, they were instructed to open it and read that card. Two minutes
later, the experimental interface was activated and presented the menu comprising
lotteries A, A-decoy and B on their screen, inviting subjects to make a choice
from it. The menu order and wording in this decision problem were identical to
those in the second treatment and, as far as lotteries A and B are concerned,
the first treatment too. Subjects in this treatment were told from the beginning
that if they chose a different lottery to the one they had been endowed with, the
experimenters would come to their desks and change their printed lottery card with
the one corresponding to their chosen lottery. Our method, therefore, imposes an
exogenous status quo and differs from within-subject designs where this emerges
endogenously as the subjects’ choice in an initial decision problem.
Table 1: Attribute dominance within the three pairs of lotteries.
First-order Second-order Expected Maximum Probability of
stochastically stochastically value prize winning the
dominant dominant largest possible
Lottery pair prize
A vs B None A Equal B A
A vs A-decoy A A A Equal Equal
B vs A-decoy None None B B A-decoy
Table 1 summarizes the dominance relationships within each of the three pairs
of lotteries that are derived from A, B and A-decoy. In particular:
1. Lottery A first- and second-order stochastically dominates A-decoy.
2. Lottery B offers a higher expected value and a higher maximum possible re-
ward than A-decoy, but a lower probability of winning that maximum reward.
In fact, B offers a lower probability than both A and A-decoy of winning more
than £3.
3. Lottery B is a mean-preserving spread of (and hence more risky than) A but
offers a higher maximum possible reward.
This summary clarifies that A does indeed asymmetrically dominate A-decoy in
menu {A, B, A-decoy}, and that A and B cannot be ranked in an unambigu-
ous manner even though, of course, every risk-averse expected-utility maximizer
would choose the former (Hadar and Russell, 1969). The three-dimensional graphs
(right) in Figure 2 illustrate the dominance relationships reported in Table 1 based
on the information in the last three columns: “Expected value”; “Maximum prize”;
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“Probability of winning more than £3”. The two-dimensional diagrams (left) sim-
plify this presentation by collapsing the first and last attribute into a single “Less
Risky” one.
Figure 2: The three treatments
(a) Treatment 1: No decoy or default lottery
Maximum
Prize
Less Risky
A
B
A
B
(b) Treatment 2: Decoy and no default lottery
Maximum
Prize
Less Risky
A
A-decoy
B
A
A-decoy
B
(c) Treatment 3: Decoy and default lottery (B)
Maximum
Prize
Less Risky
A
A-decoy
B
A
A-decoy
B
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We emphasize that, unlike previous experimental studies (Herne, 1998; Masatli-
oglu and Uler, 2013) where the asymmetrically dominated decoy and status-quo
options coincided, our study appears to be the first where individuals were faced
with the problem of deciding between keeping their default option and changing it
for a different one that itself asymmetrically dominates another option. In conjunc-
tion with the other two standard treatments, this novelty of our design is precisely
what enables one to compare the relative strengths of status quo bias and the decoy
effect and understand which one prevails over the other, if at all.
We also remark that a fourth treatment should also be included in general
when such a relative-strength question is raised concerning two phenomena. This
treatment would feature the decision problem where subjects are presented with
the binary menu after being initially endowed with lottery A. This, in particular,
would allow for a double comparison of the two effects’ relative magnitude. The
first would be the direct one that is based on our last treatment. The second
would be an indirect comparison where the choice probabilities of lottery A would
be compared relative to the neutral binary treatment, both when A is the asym-
metrically dominant option and when it is the default option in that new binary
environment. In light of the results presented below, we judged that this treatment
was redundant for the purposes of this study, and we therefore did not introduce it.
For the same reason we also did not conduct sessions for the symmetric versions of
the second and third treatments where the asymmetrically dominant and default
options are B and A, respectively.
As far as the implementation is concerned, we note that once the subjects in
all treatments confirmed their choices, they were individually invited to draw a
ball from an urn with twenty numbered balls. The number on the randomly se-
lected ball determined the prize won by that subject in a way that was true to
the chosen lottery’s description. In the case of lottery A, for example, the prize
was £2 if the number was 1–5, £4 if it was 6–10, and £6 if it was 11–20. This
had been pre-specified and communicated to subjects before the process began.
Finally, subjects were given a printed questionnaire where they were asked to en-
ter their subject ID and provide information about their field and level of study
and explain how they made the decision on which lottery to choose. Our sam-
ple comprised primarily undergraduate and postgraduate students of many fields.
There were no significant differences in student characteristics across the three
treatments, either between graduate/undergraduate or between economics/non-
economics students. Economics/finance/management students, in particular, com-
prised less than a third of participants in each treatment.
3 Results
Our choice-based findings are summarized in Table 2. In the neutral binary-menu
treatment, two thirds of all subjects chose the safer lottery A, and the difference
in the two proportions was highly significant. Remarkably, and against the decoy
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effect, introducing the asymmetrically dominated lottery A-decoy in the second
treatment actually led to a decrease in the choice probability of the target lottery A.
Although the latter was favoured by just over half of the subjects in this treatment,
the difference in the two proportions is insignificant, as is the difference in the
proportions of subjects choosing it in Treatments 1 and 2. By contrast, we find
a very significant status quo bias in the third treatment where B is the default
and A the asymmetrically dominant option, with a dramatic reversal in choice
probabilities where two thirds of all subjects chose to keep B despite the fact that
it is a mean-preserving spread of A. The choice probabilities of the two lotteries
are significantly different within treatments. In addition, the choice probabilities
of B are significantly different across the first and third treatments, while those
of A are also significantly different across the the second and third treatments.
Together, these observations lead us to the conclusion that status quo bias exists
and prevails over the (absent) decoy effect in our data.
Table 2: (i) The choice probabilities of lotteries A and B in the three treatments (top); (ii)
Treatment-effect tests on the relevant choice probabilities (bottom). p-values from 2-tailed
Fisher exact test.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
(binary) (decoy) (decoy & default)
A 0.66 0.54 0.37
B 0.34 0.45 0.61
n = 74 78 59
p-value < 0.001 0.74 0.009
Treatments 1 & 2 Treatments 1 & 3 Treatments 2 & 3
(on A) (on B) (on A)
p-value 0.138 0.003 0.059
Under the maintained assumption that the subject pools in the three treatments
are random samples that come from the same population, an important implication
of our findings is that status quo bias is sufficiently strong to completely overturn
the risk-averse behaviour exhibited by the average decision maker in the neutral
first treatment by changing it to risk-seeking behaviour in the third treatment
where the riskier lottery B was the default option. This finding appears to be
novel for choice under risk, despite the existence of an analogous result for choice
under ambiguity that was documented in Roca, Hogarth, and Maule (2006).
Such a risk-attitude reversal is obviously incompatible with the expected-utility
model. Indeed, any risk-averse (risk-seeking) decision maker whose behaviour is
captured by that model would choose lottery A (B) in all treatments. Yet, no
such decision maker would choose A in the first two and B in the third treatment,
which our results suggest that the typical individual in this population would do.
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the
ensuing literature, a natural approach to explain this behaviour is to employ a
model of reference-dependent preferences. In particular, given the probabilistic
nature of the reference point/status quo in the third treatment, a potentially suit-
able model in this class is the one due to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) which, unlike
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original and cumulative prospect theory, is well-defined in cases where the reference
point is possibly stochastic.
Under the Ko¨szegi-Rabin model, the expected payoff from lottery P when the
reference point is another lottery Q, and when both P and Q have a finite support
with the same cardinality k, is given by
U(P |Q) :=
k∑
j=1
Qj
[
k∑
i=1
Pi · u(xi|rj)
]
,
where
u(x|r) := m(x) + µ(m(x)−m(r)).
In this model, m(·) captures consumption utility whereas µ(·) captures gain-loss
utility relative to the reference value r. As in much of the analysis in Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) and other studies (e.g. Sprenger, 2015; Masatlioglu and Raymond,
2016), we assume that µ(·) is piecewise-linear, with
µ(z) :=
{
z, if z ≥ 0
λ · z, if z < 0,
where λ > 1 is the coefficient of loss aversion. Recalling now that the show-up fee
in our experiment was £2, it may be plausible to think of r = 2 as the deterministic
reference point in the first and second experimental treatments, and to augment
the lottery prizes by £2 in order to translate them into the possible final wealth
levels at the end of the experiment. It may also be plausible to think of lottery B
as the stochastic reference point in the third treatment, and to also augment the
three prizes featured in it by the riskless £2 show-up fee. Under this formulation,
the Ko¨szegi-Rabin model can explain our findings if there exist m(·) and λ > 1
such that
U(A⊕ 2 | 2) > U(B ⊕ 2 | 2) (1)
U(B ⊕ 2 |B ⊕ 2) > U(A⊕ 2 |B ⊕ 2) (2)
where P ⊕ 2 means that each possible prize in lottery P has been scaled up by £2.
Under this specification, inequalities (1) and (2) are indeed simultaneously sat-
isfied for any loss-aversion parameter λ > 1 and any CRRA consumption utility
function defined by m(z) := z
1−ρ
1−ρ or m(z) := log(z) for ρ 6= 1 and ρ = 0, re-
spectively, as well as any CARA consumption utility function defined by m(z) :=
1 − e−Az for A > 0. Therefore, this status-quo induced reversal in risk-attitudes
can be accommodated by a very large class of Ko¨szegi-Rabin preferences.
We now move on to the analysis of end-of-experiment survey responses and, in
particular, on the subjects’ own explanation on the reason why they chose that
particular lottery in their respective treatment. Responses that contained logical
errors (e.g. “because it had a higher expected value” when in fact it did not) or
those that were otherwise unclear were discarded.
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Table 3: Categorization of the subjects’ choice justification based on survey data.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Reason for choice (binary) (decoy) (decoy & default)
“Risk averse” or “opted
for the highest probability 55% 45% 32%
of the largest reward”
“Risk seeking” or “opted
for the largest 31% 53% 68%
possible reward”
“Opted for the 4% 2% –
largest middle reward”
“Opted for the
highest probability 3% – –
of the middle reward”
Other reason 4% – –
Evaluable responses 67/74 60/78 47/59
Table 3 presents the main groups into which the subjects’ responses were cate-
gorized, and how the strength of these groups varied with the treatment. In the two
primary groups, the subjects reported as their main criterion the “highest proba-
bility of the largest reward” (in which A dominates B) and “the largest possible
reward” (in which B dominates A). A few subjects –primarily economics/finance
students– either supplemented these responses with references to being “risk-averse”
or “risk-seeking”, respectively, or simply mentioned those risk attitudes directly
and without any further explanation. Although the corresponding matching re-
sponses were grouped together in the table, we stress that most subjects came
from disciplines that would not have familiarized them with the decision-theoretic
terminology for attitudes to risk, and yet they could consistently be grouped into
one of these categories. Notably, a few subjects (mainly in the binary treatment)
cited “the largest probability of the middle reward” and “the largest middle re-
ward” as their primary criterion.
All subjects were allowed to use the calculator that was embedded in the ex-
perimental interface or to use pen and paper for calculations. Most subjects did
so, and many mentioned as part of their response that they had worked out the
equality in the expected values of A and B. This suggests that the expected-value
calculation might have been the primary criterion of choice for those subjects.
As far as treatment variation is concerned, the main interest lies again in the
comparison between the neutral binary treatment and the decoy & default treat-
ment. Consistent with the observed choice-based reversal in risk attitudes, this
comparison suggests that the act of endowing subjects with the default lottery B
had a clear effect in making the “largest reward” criterion important to 68% of
evaluable subjects in the last treatment from 31% in the neutral binary treatment
(p-value from two-tailed Fisher exact test: < 0.001). Notably, only one subject in
the last treatment mentioned the “convenience” of choosing their default lottery.
These facts suggest that the majority of subjects who kept their default lottery did
so following an active deliberation on whether to change it for the alternative un-
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dominated lottery, and the outcome of this deliberation was determined in favour
of the relative advantage of the default lottery.
4 Related Literature
Other experimental studies on choice over binary money lotteries or uncertain acts
that also investigated the effect of default alternatives on choice include Samuelson
and Zeckhauser (1988), Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996), Roca, Hogarth, and Maule
(2006), Dean, Kibris, and Masatlioglu (2017) and Maltz and Romagnoli (2018).
Consistent with our findings, these papers also documented a status quo bias. As
previously noted, however, a contribution of our analysis to this literature is that
our findings appear to be the first to suggest that status quo bias is powerful enough
to overturn the decision makers’ attitude toward risk and make them risk-seeking.
A second contribution to this literature is that we find status quo bias to be robust
in a domain of choice under risk even when the relevant lotteries feature three
outcomes that generate second-order stochastic dominance vs. maximum-reward
trade-offs which cannot arise with simple binary lotteries.
Contrary to our results, however, papers that include Herne (1999), Soltani,
Martino, and Camerer (2012) and Castillo (2020) found evidence for a decoy effect
on choice under risk. Unlike our experiment that was based on lotteries with three
non-zero monetary outcomes and allowed for studying the role that the above novel
trade-offs may have on the incidence of this effect, the lotteries in all these studies
featured simple binary gambles with a single non-zero outcome. Herne (1999) and
Soltani, Martino, and Camerer (2012) used within-subject experimental designs
and reported decoy effects for a statistically significant minority of subjects. In the
latter study, the authors also found evidence for the decoy effect even when the
decoy lottery was shown to subjects but was not available to choose. Castillo (2020)
reported on between- as well as within-subject experiments with such lotteries and
found evidence to suggest that the decoy effect was present in his data, but in half
the magnitude that had been reported in previous studies.
Taking these into account, the complete absence of the decoy effect in our data
is potentially driven by the fact that the lotteries in our experiment featured three
outcomes, making it harder for subjects to detect the asymmetric dominance rela-
tionship in the relevant menu. To the extent that this is so, our analysis contributes
toward delineating the limits of this effect in choice under risk.
5 Concluding Remarks
While inertia and context-dependent choice effects are well-documented and influ-
ential behavioural phenomena, no study that we are aware of has attempted to
compare their relative strength. Knowing which phenomenon, if any, is dominant
in this sense is important for both choice-architecture and descriptive-modelling
purposes. In this paper we initiate the study of such comparisons by means of a
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novel experimental design that allowed for a direct such test between status quo
bias and the attraction/asymmetric dominance/decoy effect in an environment of
choice under risk. Our primary findings are that status quo bias prevails over the
decoy effect, is strong enough to make the average subject switch from being risk-
averse to being risk-seeking, and that the decoy effect is completely absent in this
environment. While other experimental studies in choice under risk have reported
decoy effects, the latter finding suggests that these effects may be less robust in
choice under risk than they are in other domains.
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